The Regulatory Takings Doctrine: A Critical Overview by Byrne, J. Peter
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Regulatory Takings and Resources: What Are 




The Regulatory Takings Doctrine: A Critical Overview 
J. Peter Byrne 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/regulatory-takings-and-resources 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Environmental Policy Commons, Land 
Use Law Commons, Litigation Commons, Natural Resources Management and Policy Commons, Property 
Law and Real Estate Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Citation Information 
Byrne, J. Peter, "The Regulatory Takings Doctrine: A Critical Overview" (1994). Regulatory Takings and 
Resources: What Are the Constitutional Limits? (Summer Conference, June 13-15). 
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/regulatory-takings-and-resources/2 
Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the Environment 





J. Peter Byrne, The Regulatory Takings Doctrine: A 
Critical Overview, in REGULATORY TAKINGS AND 
RESOURCES: WHAT ARE THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS? (Natural 
Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law 1994). 
 
Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson 
Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the 
Environment (formerly the Natural Resources Law 
Center) at the University of Colorado Law School. 
 
5*
The Regulatory Takings Doctrine: A Critical Overview
J. Peter Byrne




Georgetown University Law Center
I. Introduction
The regulatory takings doctrine rests on the proposition that 
regulation of property use alone, without appropriation, 
occupation, or use by the government can "take" property within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. As a result of this doctrine, 
courts may hold statutes or regulations restricting use 
unconstitutional, when the judges believe that the regulation goes 
"too far" in restricting the owner's property rights. As a remedy, 
the government must either amend the statute or regulation or pay 
compensation for the lost value of the owner's property right; the 
government may also need to pay for the owner's temporary losses in 
any event.
In my view, the regulatory takings doctrine is a pernicious 
mess that ought to be abolished. Judged by traditional 
constitutional standards, the doctrine lacks a legitimate base in 
constitutional text, tradition, or policy. Current rules are a 
hodgepodge that can neither be justified nor examined to yield 
confident predictions about future judicial decisions. The doctrine 
has become an unprincipled sword for conservative judicial activism 
seeking to defeat democratic control over natural resource 
decisionmaking. As such, aggressive interpretations of the 
regulatory takings doctrine have had the purpose and effect of 
inhibiting experimentation with new environmental initiatives.
II. Neither the Text, the Framers' Intent, nor the First One 
Hundred Years of Judicial Interpretation Support the Regulatory 
Takings Doctrine.
The Regulatory Takings Doctrine: A Critical Overview
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The Fifth Amendment provides that "private property [shall 
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." Plainly 
the language prohibits uncompensated appropriation of property 
rights by the government. (Although the Fifth Amendment applies 
only to the federal government, the Court has long held that it 
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.) But the 
verb "take" does not supply a standard by which a wide range of 
government use regulations may be evaluated, as would have the 
words, "too far" or "unreasonable." The framers used such words of 
degree throughout the Bill of Rights.
Available evidence confirms that the framers intended the 
takings clause to reach only appropriations. The leading study 
concludes that James Madison, the author of the fifth Amendment, 
intended the clause "to apply only to direct physical taking of 
property by the federal government." (William M. Treanor, The 
Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L. J. 694 (1985).) Contemporaries 
were concerned about uncompensated appropriations of land by the 
colonial and state governments; but, there is no evidence of 
concern about the common regulation of property use in settled 
areas. While the framers plainly valued property rights generally, 
that does not help interpret the scope of a specific prohibition i 
the Bill of Rights.
Judicial interpretation of the takings clause adhered to this
narrow interpretation for more than one hundred years after the
Fifth Amendment was adopted. Courts repeatedly held that
regulations that restricted use but amounted neither to outright
expropriation nor permanent physical occupation could not be a
takings. As the Supreme Court stated in 1887 in Mugler v. Kansas:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for 
purposes that are declared by valid legislation to be 
injurious to the health, morals, safety of the community, 
cannot, in any just sense be deemed a takings or an 
appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such
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legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or 
use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his 
right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the 
State that its use by any one, for certain forbidden 
purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests." (123 
U.S. at 668-69.)
Many other notable cases confirmed the same analysis. (See 
Hadacheck v. Sebastian. 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Commonwealth v. Alger, 
7 Cush, 53 (Mass. 1853); Brick Presbyterian Church v. City of New 
York. 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. 1826).
III. Pennsylvania Coal, the Fountainhead of the Regulatory Takings 
Doctrine. Was a Poorly Considered Decision that Ought to be 
Overruled.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 292 (1922), held that 
a state statute, which made it unlawful to mine coal in such a way 
as to cause the surface property of another to collapse, regulated 
the coal company's property right so severely that it amounted to 
a taking of its property without just compensation. Modern 
regulatory takings cases look pack to Pennsylvania Coal as a 
touchstone, but Justice Holmes's decision itself is opaque and 
unsatisfactory. (For an intelligent and subtle, if, perhaps, too 
lenient assessment, see Carol Rose, Mahon Reconsidered: Why the 
Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561 (1984)
For present purposes, permit me to highlight several 
deficiencies in the opinion that ought to deny it continuing 
authority. First, Holmes's says nothing about the constitutional 
rule he is displacing; he neither acknowledges that the Court is 
displacing numerous prior decisions nor explains why they are wrong 
or inadequate. Second, Holmes does not address the related question 
of what constitutional values might be furthered by the new rule.
Third, the decision does not identify what aspect of the 
company's loss made the statute unconstitutional. The Court seems
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to rely on the magnitude of economic loss, but says nothing about 
the economic value of the loss either alone or in comparison with 
its overall profit or assets. At other points, the Court seems most 
unhappy about the frustration of the company's reliance on its 
right to mine (the company essentially had purchased from the 
Mahon's predecessors forty years previously the right to mine 
without regard to the effect on the surface owner's rights). But 
the opinion does not explain why such an old private bargain should 
prevent the state from passing safety legislation, especially given 
how dramatically environmental conditions had changed in 
Pennsylvania due to advances in mining technology.
Fourth, the opinion does not give sufficient honor to 
democratic lawmaking. Holmes plainly viewed the statute as the 
product of self-interested pressure by the voting majority of 
surface owners. But this statute does not seem exceptional in its 
mix of public and private motives. Even old and philosophic judges 
claiming authority upon tenuous interpretations of the Constitution 
really should not sneer at legislatures so cavalierly. The 
Constitution finally seeks to promote the process of democratic 
self-government.
Scholars have long wondered what Holmes thought he was doing. 
Frankfurter and Brandeis were embarrassed by the decision and 
suggested that the conservative justices had put one over the 
octogenarian Holmes while he was recovering from prostate surgery. 
No similar difficulty clouds evaluation of what the justices who 
joined Holmes opinion thought they were about. These were the same 
justices that struck down the federal minimum wage law in 1923 and 
30 other exercises of state power between 1920 and 1923. These 
justices wielded the due process clause to preserve what they saw 
as the essence of laissez faire against democratic majorities. 
Pennsylvania Coal is part and parcel of the era of substantive due 
process, although the authorship of Holmes, who famously dissented 
in several due process cases, has obscured the point.
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IV. Regulatory Takings Doctrine Is a Hopeless Muddle
Regulatory takings is not the only area of constitutional law 
where practitioners bemoan and scholars deplore the incoherence of 
precedents, but it does seem that no area of law has been the 
subject of more complaint or satire for sheer incomprehensibility. 
The Court itself notoriously confessed that "it has been unable to 
develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and reason' 
require that economic injuries caused by public action require 
compensation." Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Justice Stevens acknowledged, "Even the 
wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge great uncertainty about 
the scope of the Court's takings jurisprudence." Scholars have been 
less genteel, describing the are as a "muddle," "a chaos of 
confused argument" and a "welter of confusing and apparently 
incompatible results." In my view, the task the Court has set 
itself in regulatory takings cases cannot be met with principled 
distinctions; the doctrinal melee indicates that the effort should 
be abandoned, as the Court finally concluded in another area in 
Garcia v. San Antonio M.T.A.. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
If a lawyer wished to state current takings doctrine for a 
legally trained client, she would need to identify four separate 
clusters of rule-like utterance, any one of which might be taken 
from the shelf to decide a particular case, while acknowledging the 
distinct possibility that a case might be decided on some entirely 
novel basis.
1. The oldest (1978!) and most frequently invoked formulation 
comes from Penn Central: the Court will weigh in ad hoc balance the 
"character of the government action" (which seems in practice to 
include both the type of intrusion and the significance of public 
purpose being served), the economic loss that the action visits 
upon the property owner, and the degree to which the action upsets 
justifiable, invest-backed expectations. Each factor invites the
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Court to make open-textured value judgments; moreover, the weight 
to be allocated among the various categories of conclusions may 
vary from case to case.
2. Two years after Penn Central. the Court held in Agins v. 
city of Tiburon. 447 U.S. 255 (1980), that "the application of a 
general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the 
ordinance does not substantially advance legitiamte state interests 
or denies the owner economically viable use of the land." This test 
seems quite different: an ordinance will be held unconstitutional 
if either one of two independent criteria are met. The first prong 
incorporates the means-ends test familiar from due process cases, 
but these clause have been thought to address different concerns. 
The second prong seems to require invalidation purely on the ground 
of economic loss, without regard to the competing factors stressed 
in Penn Central. This latter suggestion was followed to some extent 
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission. 112 S.Ct. 2886 
(1992), where the Court held that new regulations that deprive an 
owner of all economic value in land must be considered a taking, 
unless the use prohibited could have been enjoined as a common law 
nuisance.
3. In Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter CATV. 458 U.S. 419 
(1982), the Court held that any "permanent physical occupation" 
authorized by law of an owner's property would be considered a 
taking per se without regard to whether the occupation caused the 
owner any economic harm at all. The case involved an ordinance 
requiring apartment buildings to accept cable television wiring 
under their eaves. This rule builds upon a long tradition of 
equating physical occupation with appropriation and expresses the 
Court's longing for certain rules in at least one category of 
takings cases. As with any per se rule, the Court has had to engage 
in line drawing that has a somewhat artificial flavor; thus, in 
Loretto. itself, it distinguished permissible rules requiring 
apartment building owners to maintain fire extinguishers and
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mailboxes on the premises, and in Yee, 112 S. ct. 1522 (1992), it 
refused to find that statutory limitations on tenant eviction 
authorized a permanent physical occupation.
4. The Court justified its rule in Lorretto in part on the 
claim that the right to exclude others is "an essential attribute 
of property" that no regulation may abridge. This claim has opened 
a new field of doctrinal confusion as the Court has had to consider 
whether whatever use a law restricts is another essential attribute 
of property. So far the Court has held that the ability to bequeath 
land (Hodel v. Irving. 481 U.S. 704 (1987)) and the right to make 
some economic use of it (Lucas, supra.) are essential, but that the 
ability sell eagle wings (Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). 
Plainly, the Court has fallen into another thicket of natural law 
adjudication, and it is very difficult to see how the constitution 
authorizes or their other work equips the Justices to declare what 
are the "essential attributes" of property in the face of a 
contrary determination by a legislature generally empowered to make 
and alter property rules. In any event, it is anybody's guess what 
property rights are essential.
This brief summary quite fails to give the full measure of 
doctrinal confusion. There are subsidiary issues within the above 
categories that defy principled resolution. Perhaps the most 
notorious is the question about what baseline should be chosen to 
measure the degree of loss that an owner has suffered. Should it be 
the affected area only (e.g., the wetlands area that the developer 
cannot fill), the entire parcel (e.g., including the uplands area 
of the lot to be subdivided that may be developed), some larger 
configuration that includes property owned by the owner (now or in 
the relevant past) and used for similar purposes (e.g, all the 
developer's land in the area, perhaps including parcels recently 
subdivided and sold), or all the owner's property. Courts have 
employed all these approaches. Professor Michelman long ago 
despaired of finding any sensible solution for this problem
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(Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 
(1967), and Justice Scalia admitted in Lucas that there is no 
logical basis to select one baseline rather than another (112 S. 
Ct. at 2894 n. 7). Different but equally grave doubts surround 
inquiries into when an owner's expectations deserve protection.
The doctrinal confusion recounted here is neither incidental 
nor temporary. It arises from the immensity of the task that the 
Court has set itself in regulatory takings cases: to mark as a 
matter of principle when limitations on property use become unfair. 
Philosophy suggests no consensus, and the Constitution affords no 
guidance, except to prescribe outright confiscation. The dimensions 
of property rights can be settled only contingently through the 
political process.
V. Federal Court Enforcement of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine 
Against the States Upsets Appropriate Understandings of Federalism.
Property makes an anomalous constitutional right. Unlike 
rights to freedom of speech or to resist self-incrimination, 
federal courts have no authority to elaborate the meaning and scope 
of property. Rather, as the Supreme Court has often reiterated, 
"Property interests ... are not created by the Constitution. 
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by 
existing rules and understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law." Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 
986, 1001 (1984). Yet when the Court finds that a state land use 
regulation "takes" property, it is imposing a natural law of 
property rights upon the states' actual rules. This is most 
apparent in cases where the Court finds that a state has deprived 
an owner of an "essential attribute" of property, but it also is 
implicit in invalidation of a rule to protect the retention of 
interests by an owner gained under prior state law.
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A vivid example of this inversion of federalism is Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Commission, which, it will be recalled, 
requires compensation whenever a land use regulation deprives an 
owner of all economic value. Unless the prohibition duplicates a 
prohibition implicit in nuisance law or other state property 
doctrine. The bizarre effect of this rule is to give federal 
constitutional precedence to state judge-made common rules over 
state legislation in contravention of the state constitutional 
distribution of authority. The Lucas rule also seeks to reverse the 
practice of law-making that the states actually have pursued: 
during most of the Twentieth Century, states have dealt with 
external harms from property development through statutes and 
regulations so that they can 1) address widely distributed harms 
that are unlikely to be raised in individual lawsuits, 2) prevent 
harm before it occurs, 3) exploit scientific expertise, and 4) 
resolve value conflicts through democratic processes. As a result, 
nuisance law has become marginal and underdeveloped. The Court's 
takings approach thus reverse both the constitutional basis and the 
actual practice of state property rulemaking.
It seems fair to assert that Lucas and similar decisions 
presuppose a natural property right, the dimensions of which are 
unchanging. Consideration of the long history of English and 
American property law, however, strikingly suggests that property 
rights serve the interests of society as well as the individual and 
have evolved over time to accommodate changing social and economic 
interests and cultural understandings. American law has over time 
abolished feudal tenures, deprived husbands of legal rights in 
their wives' estates, revolutionized rights in water several times, 
and abolished slavery. (This point was recently well-made by 
Professor Sax in Lucas v , South Carolina Coastal Commission. 45 
Stan. L. Rev. 1433 (1993).) In none of these cases (with narrow 
exceptions) were those who lost rights compensated.
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Aggressive interpretation of the takings clause would 
frustrate this necessary process of accommodation between social 
needs and property rules. Indeed, the recent expansion of takings 
prohibitions seems designed to prevent the evolution of property 
law toward protection of broad ecological understandings. These 
changes may develop on two levels. First, as we become more aware 
of the environmental costs of development, regulations seek to 
force the developer to avoid, mitigate, or internalize the costs of 
the harms upon pain of prohibiting the development. Second, deep 
appreciation of the fragile basis of human flourishing within the 
web of nature may lead to greater respect for the integrity of the 
natural world through a more general restriction on the authority 
of individuals to plunder nature for wealth. Social and legal 
development along these lines remains uncertain (however desirable 
it may seem to some of us), but to the extent it occurs the takings 
clause ought not be a barrier. Byrne, Green Property, 7 Const. 
Comm. 239 (1990).
VI. Recent Expansion of Constitutional Property Rights Reflect An 
Illegitimate Attempt To Expand Judicial Power At the Expense Of 
Democratic Decisionmaking.
Expansive interpretation of the regulatory takings clause has 
become the focal point of efforts by a self-conscious group of 
lawyers to undermine the constitutional foundations of the 
regulatory state, particularly in the environmental area. The 
vagueness of the takings doctrine lends itself to such purposive 
reinterpretation, and the rhetorical overpromise of property 
veneration that typifies takings decisions invites it.
The movement has its embarrassing inconsistencies. Judges who 
built careers excoriating liberal judicial activism as subversive 
of representative government now find themselves inventing new 
rationales for discretionary judicial power. The locus classicus of 
this hypocrisy is volume 112 of the Supreme Court Reporter, where
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one can read Justice Scalia's bitter denunciation of abortion 
decisions as the activism of an "Imperial Judiciary" based on 
"philosophic predilection and moral intuition" (pages 2873-2885), 
then turn the page to read his opinion in Lucas. which sweeps aside 
precedents reaching back into the nineteenth century and 
establishes a new ground for invalidating state law that has no 
basis in constitutional text or tradition, but enshrines his 
political preference.
The forum within which takings doctrine has been most 
energetically expanded has been the recently renamed Court of 
Federal Claims. In a remarkable series of cases the court has 
rejected Congress's judgment that preventing destruction of 
wetlands serves a substantial governmental interest, insisted that 
it would focus only the area where development could not occur to 
determine diminution in value, and held that a taking could be 
found even when the owner foresaw the denial of a permit when he 
bought the subject property. (See Ciampetti v. United States. 18 
Cl.Ct. 548 (1989); Loveladies Harbor. Inc, v. United States. 15 
Cl.Ct. 381 (1988); Florida Rock Industries v. United states, 8 Cl. 
Ct. 160 (1985), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded. 791 
F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert, denied. 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), 
aff'd on remand 21 Cl.Ct. 161 (1990). In a recent eponymous case 
(Bowles v. United States, 1994 US Claims LEXIS 63), the court found 
that a lot owner had a constitutional right to build a septic 
system in a wetland. These cases perhaps suggest the folly of 
permitting a specialized court exclusive federal jurisdiction over 
an ideologically charged area of constitutional law.
VII. The Regulatory Takings Doctrine Does Not Promote Economic 
Efficiency
Generally, property owners challenge the constitutionality of 
land use regulations because they wish to pursue a profitable 
venture that an ordinance prohibits. This does not mean, of course,
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that enforcement of a regulatory takings doctrine promotes economic 
efficiency or makes society wealthier in general. All development 
imposes costs on the community. Often these costs are not borne by 
the property owner, but by few or many neighbors. Accordingly the 
owners calculation of profit for himself does not mirror what may 
be a loss to the neighbors and to the community as a whole. Many 
barriers impede the creation of an efficient market within which to 
bargain out these issues.
Moreover, property values change over time as the values of 
different uses of resources change. Undeveloped land may have a 
certain value for development as a shopping mall on the outskirts 
of town, but its value in the undeveloped state to protect a water 
basin may rise as uncontaminated water becomes more scarce. 
Depriving an owner of a right to develop his land for a certain use 
for these reasons reflects not the law forcing a "sub-optimal use 
on an owner, but a social devaluation of the proposed use to the 
point where it is no longer optimal. Paying compensation for not 
undertaking a suboptimal use cannot improve efficiency. Moreover, 
even though such uncompensated changes in property rights will 
reduce the incentive to invest generally in current land uses, this 
may an efficient hedge against eventual decreases in the values of 
current land uses. Paying compensation perversely may induce 
overinvestment in currently favored land uses. See Richard Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law, 59 et seq . (4th ed. , 1992); Louis Kaplow, 
An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509 
(1986).
VIII. The Regulatory Takings Doctrine Does Not Protect Fairness
The most persuasive argument for a regulatory takings regime 
is that there are some losses that ought to be borne by the society 
as a whole rather than by the individual upon whom they fall. But 
is not calamitous illness a better occasion for such socialization 
of loss than changes in property rules? Property owners insure
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against many foreseeable losses, such as fire and earthquake; they 
similarly can insure (or hedge) against unfavorable changes in 
legal rules.
Property owners are not a "discrete and insular minority" whom 
would normally be thought to need Enhanced constitutional 
protection against democratic lawmaking. Intentional singling out 
of particular landowners for penalty may be addressed under the due 
process or equal protection clauses. (See. e.g., City of Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Center. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
IX. A Statutory Proposal
Many foolish proposals have been put forward for legislation 
to compensate owners for regulatory losses. These focus either on 
mandating consideration of an inflated statement of the regulatory 
takings doctrine by government officials before they regulate, 
which adds expense to the regulatory process with doubtful benefit, 
or on requiring compensation for all or many regulatory losses, 
which would halt serious environmental regulation or provide large 
windfalls to owners.
Of far more benefit would be state statutes establishing 
rights of limited duration to build under existing regulatory 
permission; should thee permissions be withdrawn before they 
expire, compensation would be required. In Germany, designation of 
use through an official map grants a right to develop within the 
terms of the map for several years. In England, planning permission 
(the grant of which is discretionary) gives the owner a right to 
develop that cannot be abrogated without payment of compensation. 
In the U.S., generally speaking, owners receive no right to build 
from plans, ordinances, official maps, or even the issuance of 
building permits. (See Donald Hagman & Julian Juergensmeyer, Urban 
Planning Law 153-58 (2d ed. , 1986). Only actual expenditures in
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reasonable reliance upon the building permit give the owner any 
rights against changes in the law.
A properly drawn state statute may direct the owner to when 
she may rely upon official permission to build. Setting the right 
at the time the permit is granted (or creating some more formal 
process of planning permission) will inform the owner of the moment 
from when she may rely upon the law not changing, thus clarifying 
the responsibilities of the agency and facilitating rational 
investment decisions. To afford an earlier guarantee (say, when the 
offical map is promulgated) would require more serious planning 
processes than local governments have been willing to adopt.
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